By John Yokela and Brishon Martin

There is a Fundamental Distinction in the Mental Operations of Identification vs. Evaluation

The Nature of Identification

Identification is fundamentally a grouping process that operates horizontally across similar entities. When we identify, we mentally abstract from our sensations and perceptions to group things based on their shared characteristics. For example, when forming the concept “chair,” we observe various objects used for sitting and recognize common features like legs, seats, and backrests. Through this process, we integrate characteristics that are similar into a single mental unit that distinguishes chairs from non-chairs.

The Nature of Evaluation

In contrast, evaluation operates vertically as a ranking process. Rather than grouping things by similarities, evaluation involves ranking alternatives using general standards according to their differences. For instance, when tasting ice cream flavors, we typically rank them according to the standard of our metaphysically given taste buds. These rankings form values which typically guide our choices and actions. This vertical ranking process is also at the foundation of morality, when we make moral judgements we are ranking different alternative means to some end according to moral standards to form moral values that guide our choices and actions.

Distinctly Different Mental Operations: Epistemological vs. Ethical

Identification and Evaluation differ fundamentally in their:

Purpose

• Identification aims to form concepts by grouping similar entities
• Evaluation aims to rank different alternatives toward achieving specific ends

Method

• Identification creates horizontal groupings based on similarities
• Evaluation creates vertical hierarchies of values, or rankings, of different things based on standards

Practical Implications

The distinction becomes clear in practical applications. Consider a collection of beads: identification would involve grouping them by color, size, or material, while evaluation would involve ranking them by value or desirability according to some standard.This fundamental difference between these mental processes has important implications for how we:

• Form concepts through identification
• Make value judgments through evaluation
• Develop moral standards through their integration

Integration in Moral Evaluation

While distinct, identification and evaluation work together in moral evaluation. We first identify relevant context and alternative means to some end, then evaluate them according to a moral standard. This integration allows us to form both our understanding of the world and our judgments about it, contributing to our cognitive development and moral decision-making capabilities and the satisfaction of our moral values. The recognition of this fundamental distinction, between identification of concepts vs. evaluation of values, helps clarify how we process both facts and values; while shedding light on the different but complementary roles these mental processes play in human cognition and moral evaluations.

In a future article, we will discuss more on why Ayn Rand’s work in Epistemology is NOT the foundation for ethics as Leonard Peikoff asserts around minute 1:47:00 in this version (there are two) of his Q&A on his talk “Certainty and Happiness”:

PEIKOFF: “The key to what happened historically and to the world, lies in epistemology not in metaphysics… In my view, the whole trouble in the history of philosophy lies in the theory of concepts… What would be the fate of Objectivism if there had only been “Galt’s Speech” and no “Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology”? In other words, if we had all the philosophy that’s in “Atlas Shrugged” but no Objectivist theory of concepts. In that case, Objectivism would stand no chance — if that LACUNA had not been filled by somebody else… That [Rand’s theory of concepts] is really the foundation of it all… Every other thing in Objectivism — politics, ethics, epistemology — everything flows from concept formation… That is the essence of Objectivism and the root… It’s the theory of concepts that made me DISAGREE with Ayn Rand in her own identification of herself. We always would [discuss] what would be her place in history… I would insist that she was like Plato or Aristotle and she [Ayn Rand] would say:

PEIKOFF REPORTING ON RAND: “No, I’m just like Socrates. I need to find the ‘Plato’ [known as the first systemizing Philosopher] who will make a total philosophy out of my interesting ideas.”

PEIKOFF: She [Rand] and I argued that several times… In my mind, [Rand’s] theory of concepts…that’s what made her Plato rather than Socrates because that was now the complete total, final synthesized philosophy resting on its root… Absolutely nothing stands without that [Rand’s theory of concepts] and the whole rest of Objectivism is getting into and getting out of that [Rand’s theory of concepts].

Link to Peikoff’s statements quoted above (which were in meandering response to Brishon’s original question asked for her by her then husband) (starts around min. 1:43:00):